Harming interests - oncomice and animal transgenesis

by Arryn Ketter
April 2000 newsletter

Patent number 4,736,866 is a transgenic, nonhuman rodent whose germ and somatic cells contain an activated oncogene sequence; that is, a gene that causes an increased propensity for developing cancerous tumours. The Harvard oncomouse was created by Dr. Philip Leder and Dr. Timothy Stewart. First they extracted the 'oncogene', that gene linked to cancer in humans. Then by microinjection, they inserted it into a fertilized egg and implanted the modified egg into an adult female. The offspring—known as a transgenic animal since it has a gene sequence that was artificially added—carried the oncogene as part of its genetic makeup.

These mice could prove crucial to our scientific understanding of how genes and other exterior and environmental factors contribute to the development of cancer. They may prove beneficial in carcinogenicity studies given that significantly smaller amounts of carcinogens will need to be given, and they may also provide an invaluable resource for testing materials that are thought to prevent cancer such as antioxidants. However, despite the possible scientific and social benefits, does a moral problem present itself here; that is, do the animals have interests that are harmed by such research? Can these harms be justified? Are there moral limits to what we can do with animals?

Presently transgenic animals are being used to study gene functions, as tools in biomedical and pharmaceutical studies and as suppliers of veterinary biologics to potential organ donors for xenotransplantation. For example, half of the female oncomice will develop breast cancer before one year of age and still others are predisposed to AIDS, leukaemia and a condition similar to Alzheimer's disease. They have no life outside of the research laboratory. Some have even suggested that these animals have in fact been "programmed to suffer".

The justification given for the development and use of transgenic animals (as opposed to the other historical methods of selection and breeding) include: rapidity—"the time it takes to establish a line of animals carrying (and expressing) the desired trait is much reduced"; precision—"the specific gene of interest can be transferred with great confidence, if not efficiency, and if proper purification protocols are followed, without any accompanying, unwanted genetic material"; and convenience—"with the proper preparation, genes from almost any organism can be inserted into the desired host, whether it is a mouse or some other animal". However, none of these reasons actually addresses the question of animal suffering or the harming of the interests of the animals, likely because no unnecessary or indiscriminate suffering or harms have been identified. Where there is no unnecessary or indiscriminate suffering or harm, animals, it is argued, simply do no merit moral consideration. While most scientists and philosophers would be hesitant to espouse the Cartesian view that animals possess no mind and are incapable of suffering, many would still contend that because animals are not rational they cannot be either persons or have interests. Only humans, sui generis, have moral status or interests.

Animal transgenesis, for example, our Harvard oncomouse, for all of its potential scientific merits, harms both the health and the welfare of the animal. These animals are bred for the unique purpose of serving as tools to research human diseases. While the physical pain may be alleviated, we have yet to develop any laboratory animal which does not show signs of physical and emotional stress due to the laboratory environment. David De Grazia in Taking Animals Seriously argues that it is wrong to cause suffering regardless of who the sufferer is and "avoiding suffering is the interest most attributable to animals". If the animal's health and welfare are compromised, then it should be safe to say that the animal is suffering.

On a more abstract level, the instrumentalization of animals—making them more suitable for our manipulation and our purposes—adds a new dimension to the discussion. The fact that researchers can patent these "creations" highlights that animals are viewed in this context as mere things or commodities. In a society where animals are considered property by the law, sources of food and clothing by most individuals, and research subjects by many scientists, the additional possibility of "creating" animals increases the harm we can inflict by stretching the boundaries of what is acceptable to do to animals.